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S
ince 1980, there has been a substantial
improvement in the performance of mone-
tary policy among most of the industrialized
countries. Bernanke et al. (1998) attribute this suc-
cess to the adoption of inflation targeting, but they
are somewhat vague in defining what it means to
have an inflation target. Even countries that do not
have numerical inflation targets are said to be infla-
tion targeting if they focus on a long-term objective
for price stability (low inflation) and publish infla-
tion forecasts. By this broad definition, even the
Federal Reserve may be considered to have an infla-
tion target.
This article describes and documents 23 years
of FOMC forecasts. Congress required the Fed to
begin preparing and reporting forecasts in 1979.
Section 108 of the Humphrey-Hawkins Act explicitly
required the Fed to submit “written reports setting
forth (1) a review and analysis of recent develop-
ments affecting economic trends in the nation; (2)
the objectives and plans…with respect to the mone-
tary and credit aggregates…; and (3) the relationship
of the aforesaid objectives and plans to the short-
term goals set forth in the most recent Economic
Report of the President.” In order to satisfy the third
item, the Federal Reserve Chairman began report-
ing a summary of Fed policymakers’ forecasts to
Congress in July 1979.1 Since then, similar summa-
ries of forecasts have been reported every February
and July. Forecasts are made of annual, fourth-
quarter-over-fourth-quarter growth rates for nominal
gross domestic product (GDP), real GDP, and infla-
tion.2 Fed policymakers also forecast the average
level of unemployment for the fourth quarter of
the year. In February, the forecasts pertain to the
current calendar year (referred to below as the 12-
month-ahead forecasts). In July, forecasts are updated
for the current calendar year (6-month-ahead fore-
casts) and preliminary projections are made for the
next calendar year (18-month-ahead forecasts). 
Separate forecasts are made by each of the FOMC
members (and nonvoting Federal Reserve Bank
presidents), but the individual forecasts are not
published.3 Rather, the Fed reports two summary
statistics: the low and the high forecast among all
the policymakers and the central tendency, which
has been reported since February 1983 and is a
smaller range that omits extreme forecasts. 
This paper evaluates the information content
of the two summary statistics, the full range and
central tendency, and defines two FOMC forecasts
based on those statistics: the midpoint of the full
range (FR) and the midpoint of the central tendency
range (CT). The paper compares forecast accuracy,
tests for bias and efficiency, and uses encompassing
tests to see whether either of these summary statis-
tics encompasses the other. Admittedly, the two
forecasts calculated from the FR and CT are quite
close. In many of the tests, we cannot distinguish
between the two. However, where statistically signifi-
cant differences exist, they generally favor the use
of the FR.
THE HISTORICAL RECORD
If the outlying forecasts for the FR and CT are
symmetric, then the two will be the same. The FOMC
has generated a large number of forecasts since
1979. There are two alternative ranges for each of
four forecasted economic variables made at three
different horizons (24 separate forecast series rang-
3 The FOMC is the policymaking committee of the Federal Reserve
System. When the Board is full, the Committee consists of the 7 gover-
nors of the Board, the president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York, and 4 of the remaining 11 Federal Reserve Bank presidents who
serve on a rotating basis. All 12 presidents attend every meeting,
contribute to the discussion, and provide forecasts that are summa-
rized in testimony to the Congress. In this article, when we refer to the
FOMC forecasts we mean the summary of forecasts that are collected
from FOMC members and nonvoting Federal Reserve Bank presidents.
1 The reporting requirements of the Humphrey-Hawkins Act expired
in May 2000. Congress amended and continued the reporting require-
ments in the American Homeownership and Economic Opportunity
Act of 2000 (Section 1003).
2 The Fed followed the Bureau of Economic Analysis, switching from
GNP to GDP in 1992.
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cast with the outcome, we measure actual output,
inflation, and unemployment using real-time data
rather than the latest vintage data. 
There is always an issue about how to define
the “actual” data because the data are regularly
revised as we get more information about the past.
The analysis in this paper is based on the real-time
data that are maintained at the Federal Reserve Bank
of Philadelphia. They created vintages of data that
were available in the middle of the following months:
February, May, August, and November.4 Except
where explicitly noted, the actual values are taken
from the first report for a calendar year that occurs
at the end of January and is stored in the “February”
files by the Philadelphia Fed.
In preliminary work we examined the root-
mean-squared errors (RMSE) calculated using the
different versions of the data that became available
during the year following the forecast period. We
found that the FOMC’s nominal GDP and real GDP
forecasts were most accurate for the first released
figures reported in February. The FR forecast for
inflation was about equally accurate using the
February or November data, and the CT inflation
forecast was most accurate using the November
data. In all cases the inflation forecasts were closer
to the February version than they were to the May
version. The unemployment data were rarely revised
within the first year, and there were no revisions to
the fourth-quarter average in our sample.
The 12-month forecasts are used to illustrate
the FOMC forecasts in Figure 1. The top panel of
Figure 1 shows nominal GDP growth. Through 1995,
the FOMC, on average, overpredicted nominal GDP
growth. The nominal GDP forecast errors were
particularly large in years that included recessions:
1981-82, 1990-91, and 2001. On average the real
GDP forecasts shown in the second panel appear to
be unbiased, but the forecast errors were large and
negative in recessions and large and positive in the
years 1995 through 1999. There was an unexpected
increase in productivity growth during the latter
half of the 1990s. 
The third panel shows the inflation forecasts
made by the FOMC. The FOMC began forecasting
the implicit price deflator for GNP in 1979. Much
of the bias in the nominal GDP forecast came from
a tendency to overpredict inflation in the 1980s.
The FOMC continued reporting forecasts for the
deflator until 1989, when it began making inflation
forecasts in terms of the consumer price index (CPI).
CPI inflation accelerated to 7 percent in the second
two quarters of 1990, exceeding the FOMC forecasts.
Inflation decelerated rapidly in 1991 and stayed,
on average, below the forecast through the 1990s.
In 2000, the FOMC switched once again, this time
to the chain price index for personal consumption
expenditures (PCE).
The fourth-quarter average unemployment rate
is shown in the bottom panel of Figure 1. Here, the
interesting features are the trend decline of unem-
ployment that appears to mirror the decline of
inflation, the tendency to overpredict unemployment
in the 1990s (another facet of the surprisingly high
productivity growth), and the relatively accurate pre-
diction of unemployment in the 1990-91 recession. 
Descriptive statistics and tests comparing the
alternative forecasts are shown in Table 1. Our analy-
sis uses 1983-2001 data for the 6- and 12-month
forecasts and 1984-2001 data for the 18-month fore-
casts so that we can compare the forecasts derived
from the FR with those computed from the CT.5
Five statistics are reported in Table 1: the mean error,
the RMSE, p-values from a Wilcoxon signed-rank
statistic that tests whether the RMSEs from the FR
and CT forecasts are equal, the widths of the inter-
vals for FR and CT, and the percentage of times that
the actual value fell outside the FR and CT.
As we saw with the 12-month forecasts in
Figure 1, the FOMC tended to overpredict inflation,
nominal GDP growth, and the unemployment rate.
In each of these cases, the negative bias in the mean
error was largest for the 18-month forecasts. There
was no bias in the 6-month real GDP forecast and a
positive bias in the 12- and 18-month real GDP
forecasts.
The RMSEs are shown in the second row of
each panel. The nominal GDP RMSEs were largest,
10 to 20 percent larger than those for real GDP and
almost twice as large as those for inflation. Generally,
the real GDP growth and inflation errors were weakly
negatively correlated. The probability values of a
Wilcoxon signed-rank test are reported in paren-
theses in the third row of each panel for the FR
forecasts. This is a test of the null hypothesis that
28 MAY/JUNE 2003
5 See Gavin and Mandal (2002) for an analysis of the FR forecasts for
output and inflation, including a comparison with the Blue Chip
consensus and Green Book forecasts. They find that the FOMC’s out-
put forecasts were as good as the Blue Chip and Green Book forecasts.
The FOMC’s inflation forecasts were better than the Blue Chip, but
not as good as the Green Book.
Gavin R EVIEW
4 The forecasts and real-time data used in this article are available on
the Bank’s web site: <research.stlouisfed.org>.MAY/JUNE 2003      29
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NOTE: Actual values (blue dashed lines) are those first available in February of the following year.
The FR is shown by a solid line and the CT by the black dotted line.
Figure 1the RMSEs from the FR and CT forecasts are equal.
We use a Wilcoxon signed-rank statistic because
Diebold and Mariano (1995) show that this test
statistic is well-sized in cases where the sample is
small and the alternative forecast errors are highly
correlated and possibly serially correlated—as we
expect for the 18-month forecasts.6 In only 2 of
the 24 cases is the probability value less than 10
percent—the 18-month forecasts for nominal GDP
growth and inflation. In both cases the forecast
derived from the FR was more accurate than the
forecast derived from the CT.
The fourth row of each panel reports the average
30 MAY/JUNE 2003
Gavin R EVIEW
FOMC Forecasts by Forecast Horizon
FR CT
6-month 12-month 18-month 6-month 12-month 18-month
Nominal GDP
Mean error –0.31 –0.17 –0.43 –0.35 –0.18 –0.59
RMSE 0.97 1.34 1.52 0.93 1.45 1.67
Wilcoxon signed-rank test (p-value) (0.98) (0.14) (0.05)
Width of range in percentage points 1.61 2.09 2.37 0.66 0.72 0.98
Percent of time outside the range 53 58 44 79 89 72
Real GDP
Mean error –0.01 0.25 0.19 0.00 0.20 0.09
RMSE 0.78 1.26 1.33 0.79 1.27 1.41
Wilcoxon signed-rank test (p-value) (0.86) (0.86) (0.56)
Width of range in percentage points 1.11 1.43 1.55 0.42 0.53 0.51
Percent of time outside the range 68 68 50 95 100 78
Inflation
Mean error –0.29 –0.41 –0.60 –0.34 –0.39 –0.65
RMSE 0.51 0.69 0.85 0.52 0.69 1.01
Wilcoxon signed-rank test (p-value) (0.42) (0.92) (0.07)
Width of range in percentage points 0.95 1.32 1.94 0.39 0.49 0.63
Percent of time outside the range 47 53 39 89 74 67
Unemployment
Mean error –0.15 –0.29 –0.31 –0.12 –0.20 –0.23
RMSE 0.38 0.60 0.81 0.37 0.63 0.80
Wilcoxon signed-rank test (p-value) (0.70) (0.73) (0.76)
Width of range in percentage points 0.56 0.64 0.88 0.19 0.22 0.35
Percent of time outside the range 37 68 67 68 89 78
NOTE: Wilcoxon’s signed-rank test is used to test the null hypothesis that the forecasts are equally accurate (that is, the RMSEs are
equal). The significance levels were computed from a program provided by Rob van Son found at
<http://www.fon.hum.uva.nl/Service/Statistics/Signed_Rank_Algorihms.html>.
Bold cells indicate that the probability value is less than 10 percent.
The data span the period 1983-2001 for 6- and 12-month horizons and 1984-2001 for the 18-month horizon.
Table 1
6 The 18-month forecast for year t is made before the actual value for
year t–1 is known. Any surprise in the actual value for year t–1 will be
part of the forecast error for year t–1. This surprise is also likely to be
reflected in the actual value (and forecast error) for year t. Thus, we
can expect first-order serial correlation in the 18-month forecast errors.width of the FR or CT intervals. The width of the
range is the distance in percentage points between
the high- and low-point forecasts. We define the
FOMC consensus forecast as the midpoint of the
range between the high and low forecasts. A way to
gauge whether the range is a good measure of the
uncertainty about the forecast is to see how often
the actual value falls outside the range. The bottom
row in each panel reports the percentage of time
that the outcome fell outside the reported FR or CT.
The actual values were outside the CT most of the
time, indeed, all of the time for the 12-month output
forecasts. 
The average width of the FR for the 18-month
output forecasts is 1.55 percentage points. The actual
value fell outside this range 50 percent of the time.
The range of 12-month output forecasts was almost
as wide (1.43 percentage points), but the actual
value fell outside this range 68 percent of the time.
At the shortest horizon, the width of the range fell
to 1.11 percentage points, and the actual value also
fell outside this range 68 percent of the time.
The economic future is always uncertain, and a
wider forecast range reflects greater disagreement
among the policymakers about economic trends
and policy objectives. However, even if the forecasts
of all the policymakers were identical (perfect con-
sensus), they would likely be wrong because the
future is inherently unpredictable. Table 2 attempts
to gauge the degree of consensus about the outlook,
relative to the economy’s unpredictability. The table
shows the ratios of the RMSEs of the consensus
forecasts to one-half the width of the forecast ranges.
(We use one-half the range to make the scale com-
parable to the RMSE, which is an index of unpre-
dictability.) The width of the range is an inverse
measure of consensus. As such, the ratios reveal, in
a simple way, the degree of consensus among the
policymakers about the outlook for a variable, rela-
tive to the difficulty of predicting that variable. A
high ratio, for example, indicates a strong consensus
regarding the outlook, relative to the unpredictability
of the variable.
In every case except for the 18-month inflation
forecasts, the RMSE is larger than half the width of
the range. Paradoxically, the highest figures (where
the consensus is strong relative to the degree of
predictability) are for “real” variables, such as GDP
and the unemployment rate, over which the Fed has
little control. At the same time, the smallest figures
are observed for inflation, over which the Fed is
widely regarded as having considerable influence,
although perhaps not over horizons as short as 18
months. The individual inflation forecasts reflect,
to a greater or lesser extent, the policymaker’s beliefs
about the desired long-run inflation objective. Among
inflation forecast horizons, the least consensus
emerges for the longest horizon—18 months—where
the Fed’s control presumably is the strongest. Since
the formation of the European Central Bank, the
United States and Japan are the only major central
banks in the world that do not announce a numerical
objective for inflation. The statistics in Table 2 sug-
gest one reason why U.S. policymakers may have
been reluctant to adopt a specific objective for infla-
tion—namely, there is little consensus about what
the numerical objective should be. 
ARE THE FOMC FORECASTS UNBIASED?
There is a problem in evaluating the FOMC infla-
tion forecasts because, as noted above, the FOMC
switched among price indices over our sample
period. Our analysis in Figure 1 and Tables 1, 2, and
A1 used the inflation forecasts for the different price
indices as they were reported. In the remaining
part of the paper, we use an implied forecast that is
calculated by subtracting the midpoint of the range
of real GDP forecasts from the midpoint of the range
of nominal GDP forecasts (Tables 3 through 5). We
do this because the FOMC has consistently fore-
casted nominal and real output since 1979. Even
when the Fed was basing the inflation forecast on
the CPI (from 1989 through 1999), they were also
reporting forecasts for both nominal and real output,
so there was always an implied forecast for the
output deflator.
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A Relative Measure of FOMC Consensus
Forecast horizon
6-month 12-month 18-month
Nominal GDP 1.21 1.28 1.28
Real GDP 1.40 1.76 1.72
Inflation 1.08 1.05 0.87
Unemployment 1.35 1.86 1.83  
NOTE: The values in this table are calculated as the ratio of the
RMSE to one-half the width of the range as reported in Table 1.
It is a measure of the predictive uncertainty (RMSE) divided
by an inverse measure of policy consensus. Therefore, a high
number indicates a relatively high degree of consensus.
Table 2In this section, we check the alternative forecasts
for unbiasedness and estimate the following regres-
sion in the first part of our test:
(1) xt=α+β t–ixt
f+t–iεt,
where x is the variable being forecast (the fourth-
quarter-over-fourth-quarter growth rate of output
or the price deflator for output). The forecast (x
f) is
indexed according to the time when the forecast was
made (t–i, where i refers to three forecast horizons)
and the year to which it applies (t). If the estimates
of (α, β) are equal to (0,1), the forecasts are unbiased.
We use an F-statistic to test for unbiasedness. Holden
and Peel (1990) show that even if we can reject the
null hypothesis that (α, β) is equal to (0,1), it is still
possible that the forecasts may be unbiased. The
intuition for their result can be understood by think-
ing about equation (1) as a mechanism for combin-
ing unbiased forecasts where the constant is an
unbiased forecast of the series. If we cannot reject
the null hypothesis, we can conclude that the fore-
cast is unbiased. If we reject the null hypothesis, it is
necessary to examine the properties of the forecast
error, xt – t–ixt
f. To make a complete test of unbi-
asedness, we also compute the regression
(2)                         xt – t–ixt
f=γ+t–iε t
γ
and test whether γ is equal to zero. In addition, we
must take account of possible serial correlation in
the error for the July next-year forecast. Because
the forecast horizon is longer than the interval over
which output growth is measured, the forecast error
for year t is not available when the forecasts for year
t+1 are made. Therefore, information that arrives
in the second half of year t may be reflected in fore-
cast errors for both years t and t+1. If it does, the
errors will display first-order serial correlation. For
this case, Hansen (1982) has shown that ordinary
least-squares (OLS) estimates will be unbiased, but
the standard errors will be too small, leading to too
many rejections of the null hypothesis. Therefore we
use the correction for serial correlation suggested
by Hansen (1982) when we report test statistics for
the July next-year forecasts. 
OLS estimates of equations (1) and (2) for the
FOMC forecasts are listed in Table 3, which includes
the estimates of α and β, with standard errors in
parentheses. The third column of results shows the
probability values of the F-statistic for the null joint
hypothesis that (α, β)=(0,1). For the 12 cases with
nominal and real output, the probability values are
all above 10 percent, so we conclude that the out-
put forecasts are unbiased. Table 2 also reports the
t-statistics for estimates of γ in equation (2). It is not
necessary to estimate equation (2) in the case of
the output forecasts, however, because we could
not reject unbiasedness using the F-statistic. 
In contrast, the probability values of the F-
statistic for the inflation and unemployment forecasts
are quite low. In the case of inflation, the F-statistic
always rejects unbiasedness at a 10 percent level.
The fifth column of Table 3 reports the probability
values for the t-statistic for testing whether γ is equal
to zero. Here we find strong evidence that the infla-
tion forecasts are biased, which is not too surprising
since the inflation forecasts were above actual infla-
tion most of the time (see Figure 1). In the case of
the unemployment rate, we could reject the joint
hypothesis that (α, β)=(0,1) in five of the six cases.
In two of those, however, we could not reject that
the mean of the forecast error was zero. Here, the
FR forecasts for unemployment were found to be
significantly biased, but the CT forecasts were not.
ARE THE FOMC FORECASTS EFFICIENT?
Forecasts are considered efficient if the forecaster
takes account of all relevant information. This means
that forecasters continue to invest in using more
information as long as benefits of using more infor-
mation exceed the costs of acquiring it. In practice,
we check for informational efficiency by testing
whether the forecast errors are systematically related
to information that was readily available when the
forecasts were made. Because the data set is small,
we check for a bivariate relationship between the
forecast errors and information from the past. To
conduct this test for efficiency, we run the following
regression:
(3)                    t–iet=α+β t–ix
k
t–j+t–iut,
where t–iet is the forecast error for year t (for each
of the four variables) made at the t–ihorizon. So
there will be a total of 24 different dependent vari-
ables: The FR and the CT each have three horizons
for each of the four forecasted variables. The term
t–ix
k
t–j is the t–j information variable that was avail-
able when the forecast was made. Thus, j=2 when
the dependent variable is an 18-month forecast
error, and j=1 when it is a 6- or 12-month forecast
error. The superscript k refers to the information
variable included in our efficiency test.
In principle, we could test efficiency against
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forecasts were made. In Table 4A, we include the
most recently available information on the variables
being forecasted—nominal GDP growth, real GDP
growth, inflation, and the unemployment rate. The
table includes the p-values for the t-statistic testing
the null hypothesis that β=0. We also derive Q-
statistics (from the regression of the forecast error
on the last observed value of the forecasted variable)
to test for serial correlation in the forecast errors.
For example, in Table 4A, the first row of results are
calculated using the 18-month nominal GDP fore-
cast error. The Q-statistic is taken from the equation
that includes past nominal GDP growth on the right-
hand side. In the second row of each panel, the
forecast error for real GDP growth is the dependent
variable and the Q-statistic is taken from the equa-
tion that includes past GDP growth as the informa-
tion variable.
The top panel of Table 4A includes tests using
the 18-month forecasts. The July next-year forecast
is made before the current-year results are known,
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Tests for Unbiasedness








Forecast α (SE)  β (SE) F-statistic (p-value) γ (p-value)
Nominal GDP 6-month FR –0.477 (0.86) 1.028 (0.14) 0.396 0.172
6-month CT –0.560 (0.80) 1.035 (0.13) 0.268 0.104
12-month FR 0.269 (1.32) 0.925 (0.22) 0.823 0.596
12-month CT 0.674 (1.41) 0.855 (0.23) 0.720 0.599
18-month FR 1.444 (1.94) 0.681 (0.33) 0.326 0.245
18-month CT 2.182 (1.72) 0.541 (0.28) 0.101 0.141
Real GDP 6-month FR –0.301 (0.47) 1.098 (0.15) 0.799 0.960
6-month CT –0.312 (0.48) 1.105 (0.15) 0.781 1.000
12-month FR –0.068 (0.92) 1.115 (0.32) 0.677 0.412
12-month CT –0.697 (1.08) 1.330 (0.38) 0.542 0.484
18-month FR –0.124 (1.49) 1.121 (0.56) 0.829 0.560
18-month CT 0.644 (1.67) 0.794 (0.61) 0.915 0.800
Inflation 6-month FR –0.075 (0.35) 0.926 (0.11) 0.028 0.009
6-month CT –0.198 (0.35) 0.952 (0.11) 0.009 0.002
12-month FR 0.233 (0.41) 0.790 (0.13) 0.006 0.005
12-month CT 0.256 (0.43) 0.788 (0.13) 0.012 0.009
18-month FR 0.115 (0.54) 0.775 (0.16) 0.002 0.001
18-month CT 0.592 (0.59) 0.615 (0.17) 0.001 0.003
Unemployment 6-month FR 0.395 (0.40) 0.909 (0.06) 0.080 0.072
6-month CT 0.671 (0.35) 0.868 (0.06) 0.036 0.152  
12-month FR 0.798 (0.56) 0.824 (0.09) 0.019 0.033
12-month CT 1.144 (0.57) 0.779 (0.09) 0.032 0.160
18-month FR 1.425 (0.96) 0.713 (0.16) 0.058 0.099 
18-month CT 1.480 (1.01) 0.713 (0.17) 0.122 0.218
NOTE: FR represents the forecasts calculated as the midpoint of the full range and CT represents the forecasts calculated as the mid-
point of the CT. The tests use the sample period for which the CT is available: 1983-2001 for 6- and 12-month forecasts and 1984-2001
for 18-month forecasts. Bold cells indicate that the probability value is less than 10 percent.
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Are the FOMC Forecasts Efficient? History of Forecast Variables
(Using May vintage for July forecasts, values in the table are probability values for the t-statistic on the coefficient β
in equation (3):  t–iet=α+β t–ix
k
t–j+t–iut.)
Nominal GDP Real GDP Inflation Unemployment rate Q*
6-month forecast errors
FR
Nominal GDP 0.25 0.64 0.23 0.67 0.00
Real GDP 0.10 0.30 0.28 0.49 0.01
Inflation 0.58 0.38 0.58 0.70 0.11
Unemployment rate 0.22 0.20 0.93 0.08 0.04
CT
Nominal GDP 0.14 0.56 0.11 0.64 0.00
Real GDP 0.03 0.21 0.15 0.41 0.03
Inflation 0.34 0.22 0.66 0.55 0.16
Unemployment rate 0.12 0.08 0.75 0.01 0.39
12-month forecast errors
FR
Nominal GDP 0.21 0.58 0.25 0.70 0.03
Real GDP 0.27 0.46 0.57 0.28 0.06
Inflation 0.67 0.71 0.14 0.12 0.11
Unemployment rate 0.52 0.48 0.90 0.05 0.05
CT
Nominal GDP 0.10 0.38 0.23 0.60 0.01
Real GDP 0.21 0.48 0.37 0.21 0.09
Inflation 0.24 0.57 0.32 0.15 0.01
Unemployment rate 0.42 0.44 0.94 0.02 0.22
18-month forecast errors
FR
Nominal GDP 0.01 0.08 0.30 0.82 0.38
Real GDP 0.08 0.17 0.51 0.34 0.23
Inflation 0.10 0.28 0.34 0.11 0.16
Unemployment rate 0.17 0.23 0.73 0.03 0.01
CT
Nominal GDP 0.02 0.17 0.10 0.86 0.47
Real GDP 0.10 0.22 0.48 0.46 0.18
Inflation 0.11 0.62 0.05 0.07 0.04
Unemployment rate 0.19 0.31 0.60 0.05 0.01
*Q is a test for randomness based on the first four autocorrelations of the residual in the regression with the lag of the forecast variable.
For example, in the first row of each panel we use the residuals from the equation including lagged nominal GDP growth. Bold cells
indicate that the probability value is less than 10 percent.
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Are the FOMC Forecasts Efficient? Interest Rates and Money
(Using June interest rates for July forecasts and January rates for February forecasts, values in the table are probability




10-year 1-year Overnight federal 
Treasury bond Treasury bill funds rate M1 M2 M3
6-month forecast errors
FR
Nominal GDP 0.78 0.96 0.86 0.40 0.86 0.73
Real GDP 0.70 0.66 0.49 0.54 0.82 0.62
Inflation 0.89 0.47 0.37 0.54 0.94 0.84
Unemployment rate 0.66 0.47 0.57 0.15 0.96 0.70
CT
Nominal GDP 0.53 0.65 0.53 0.46 0.89 0.68
Real GDP 0.48 0.42 0.26 0.42 1.00 0.89
Inflation 0.91 0.51 0.36 0.96 0.76 0.54
Unemployment rate 0.57 0.57 0.76 0.07 0.98 0.70
12-month forecast errors
FR
Nominal GDP 0.35 0.32 0.34 0.99 0.54 0.42
Real GDP 0.67 0.57 0.59 0.94 0.46 0.36
Inflation 0.20 0.29 0.30 0.87 0.83 0.90
Unemployment rate 0.67 0.83 0.99 0.42 0.65 0.67
CT
Nominal GDP 0.27 0.25 0.26 0.99 0.59 0.45
Real GDP 0.59 0.46 0.46 0.92 0.34 0.26
Inflation 0.12 0.24 0.25 0.83 0.46 0.55
Unemployment rate 0.68 0.99 0.79 0.27 0.56 0.63
18-month forecast errors 
FR
Nominal GDP 0.17 0.13 0.11 0.83 0.99 0.96
Real GDP 0.54 0.37 0.26 0.87 0.91 0.70
Inflation 0.06 0.11 0.23 0.40 0.77 0.46
Unemployment rate 0.94 0.54 0.38 0.13 0.81 0.70
CT
Nominal GDP 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.93 0.87 0.96
Real GDP 0.45 0.30 0.21 0.60 0.95 0.72
Inflation 0.03 0.06 0.14 0.26 0.83 0.58
Unemployment rate 0.79 0.44 0.30 0.14 0.92 0.76
*Q is a test for randomness based on the first four autocorrelations of the residual in the regression with the lag of the forecast variable.
For example, in the first row we use the residuals from the equation including lagged nominal GDP growth. Bold cells indicate that
the probability value is less than 10 percent.
Table 4Bso in this case we use the results from the previous
year. We are testing whether the 18-month forecast
errors from year t are related to the variables dated
t–2. We report results using both the FR and the CT
forecasts. In the case of the FR, coefficients on nomi-
nal GDP growth, real GDP growth, and inflation are
statistically significant at a 10 percent critical level.
In the case of the CT forecasts, the nominal GDP
forecast errors are related to past nominal GDP
growth and past inflation. Inflation forecast errors
are related to past inflation and to the past unemploy-
ment rate.
The 12-month forecasts are shown in the middle
panel. There is only one significant coefficient
among the 24 coefficients reported. The CT forecast
for nominal GDP growth is correlated with last year’s
nominal GDP growth. However, six of the eight Q-
statistics have probability values less than 10 per-
cent. In the case of the 6-month forecasts, none of
the FR forecasts were related to past values of the
information variables, but both the nominal and
real GDP forecasts errors were serially correlated.
Since the FOMC was also setting targets for
monetary growth and the federal funds rate for
much of this period, the forecasts were checked
for efficiency with respect to information about
monetary growth and interest rates. The FOMC set
targets for M1, M2, and M3; all were included. Also
included were the currently observed interest rates
for the overnight federal funds rate, 1-year Treasury
bills, and 10-year Treasury bonds. Although the
FOMC does not set targets for Treasury rates, they
embody expectations about future inflation and
future overnight interest rates. 
The results including money and interest rates
are shown in Table 4B. The monetary data were
those reported to the FOMC at the first policy meet-
ing of the year. They are fourth-quarter-over-fourth-
quarter growth rates. The interest rates are averages
for the months of January (used with the February
forecasts) and June (used with the July forecasts).
Again, there is almost no evidence that this informa-
tion was ignored. An exception may be the 18-month
CT forecasts for nominal GDP and inflation. Here,
the forecast errors for nominal GDP growth and
inflation are significantly related to interest rates.
Only in one case, the 6-month forecast error for
the unemployment rate, was past money growth
significant.
With some exceptions, the forecast errors
appear to be serially correlated, but unrelated to
our information variables. When the forecasts fail
tests for efficiency, it is usually a forecast calculated
from the CT rather than the FR. We estimated 240
coefficients on past information. We found that 19
of these were significant at a 10 percent level; of
those 19, only 4 applied to cases using an FR fore-
cast. Overall, there were fewer significant coefficients
than one would expect to observe by chance, even
if the forecasts were fully efficient.
DO EITHER THE RANGE OR CENTRAL
TENDENCY FORECASTS ENCOMPASS
THE OTHER?
In this section, we test whether the CT or the
FR encompasses the other. We say that one forecast
encompasses another if the former incorporates
all of the relevant information of the latter. If it does,
then adding information from the latter will not












We test the alternative, that is, forecast x
ct encom-
passes x
fr, by switching the roles of the FR and CT
forecasts. The results of the encompassing tests are
shown in Table 5. The results are p-values for the
t-statistic testing that the coefficient β is equal to
zero. In all cases except the unemployment forecasts,
the probability values are greater than 10 percent
and we cannot reject that they both encompass the
other. In practical terms, this means that if you have
one forecast, you do not need the other. In the case
of the unemployment rate, we can reject that the
18- and 12-month FR forecasts encompass the CT
tendency forecasts, and that the 12- and 6-month
CT forecasts encompass the respective FR forecasts.
In practical terms, this means that there is useful
and independent information in both forecasts.
CONCLUSIONS 
This article reviews two decades of experience
with FOMC forecasts. As one would expect, forecasts
calculated from the FR are very similar to those
calculated from the CT. In the two cases where there
is a significant difference, the forecasts constructed
from the FR were more accurate than those calcu-
lated from the CT. In two cases where the FOMC was
forecasting the next calendar year in July, we found
that the nominal GDP and inflation forecasts that
36 MAY/JUNE 2003
Gavin R EVIEWincluded the outliers were significantly more accu-
rate than those taken from the CT. We also found
that the sizes of the ranges reported were not very
closely related to the inherent unpredictability in a
variable. Nominal and real output growth rates were
more variable and less predictable than inflation,
but the range for the high and low 18-month infla-
tion forecasts were larger than those for the output
measures. One inference is that there was a wide
difference of opinion among FOMC members regard-
ing the medium-term outlook for inflation, relative
to the underlying predictability of inflation. This may
explain, in part, the FOMC’s reluctance to publicly
commit to an inflation target.
We could not reject the hypothesis that the
FOMC forecast was unbiased in any case involving
nominal or real output growth. In contrast, all six
forecasts of inflation were significantly biased. In
the case of the unemployment rate, we could reject
unbiasedness for all of the forecasts calculated from
the FR, but for none calculated from the CT.
In general, the FOMC passed tests for efficiency
when the tests involved past values of nominal and
real output growth, inflation, the unemployment
rate, interest rates, and monetary growth. To the
extent that the CT and the FR were different, the CT
failed the tests more often, especially in the cases
using the 18-month forecasts. The encompassing
tests did not distinguish between the CT and the FR
forecasts.
Overall, the FR forecasts produced smaller
RMSEs and were more efficient than the CT forecasts.
For the purposes of doing research using the FOMC’s
GDP growth and inflation forecasts, the FR is almost
certainly preferred, since it did at least as well on
every count as the CT. Furthermore, the Fed pub-
lished the FR from July 1979 on, whereas the CT
did not become available until 1983.
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Encompassing Tests for the FOMC Forecasts: FR and CT








Nominal GDP forecasts Real GDP forecasts
Forecast horizon FR encompasses CT CT encompasses FR FR encompasses CT CT encompasses FR
6-month 0.68 0.84 0.45 0.41
12-month 0.57 0.80 0.64 0.37
18-month 0.31 0.17 0.83 0.69
Inflation forecasts Unemployment forecasts
FR encompasses CT CT encompasses FR FR encompasses CT CT encompasses FR
6-month 0.73 0.78 0.23 0.03
12-month 0.18 0.28 0.05 0.04
18-month 0.11 0.26 0.07 0.14
NOTE: Bold cells indicate the null hypothesis (that the FR encompasses the CT or vice versa) is rejected with a 10 percent critical region.
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Method of Moments Estimators.” Econometrica, July 1982,
50(4), pp. 1029-54.
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The FOMC forecasts are taken directly from
the monetary policy reports to Congress. The first
report was made in February 1979, but forecasts
were not included with the initial release of the
report. 
Tables A1 through A4 include the nominal GDP
growth, real GDP growth, inflation, and fourth-
quarter average unemployment rate forecasts.
These forecasts come from the semiannual mone-
tary policy reports made by the Fed. The inflation
forecasts in Table A3 include forecasts for a mix
of price indices, the output deflator, the CPI, and
the chain price index for PCE.
Tables A5 and A6 include the real-time data
from the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia web
site. The data are constructed from the quarterly
data files that include vintages of data that were
available in the middle of each indicated month—
February, May, August, and November. For example,
the February 1980 file contains the data that were
available to the FOMC in 1980, when the Fed made
its February 1980 monetary policy report. The
exception was for 1995. In early 1996, the Bureau
of Economic Analysis switched to the chain
weighted indices for GDP and delayed publishing
the initial release until March of 1996. Therefore,
the February data for the fourth-quarter-over-
fourth-quarter value for 1995 comes from the
March issue of the Survey of Current Business
(Table 7.1).
Table A7 includes the fourth-quarter-over-
fourth-quarter growth rates of the monetary aggre-
gates as they were reported following the annual
benchmarking in February each year. This is the
real-time monetary data that the FOMC would have
had at the first FOMC meeting each year. This table
also includes the real-time CPI data and PCE chain
price data. The monetary growth rates and CPI
are taken from the monetary policy reports. The
real-time price data for PCE are from the February
release of the Survey of Current Business. Table A8
includes the January and June monthly average
interest rates for overnight federal funds, 1-year
Treasury bills, and 10-year Treasury bonds. These
are from the Fed’s H.15 release. MAY/JUNE 2003      39
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FOMC Nominal GNP/GDP Forecasts by Forecast Horizon
6-month 12-month 18-month
FR CT FR CT FR CT
1979 8 to 10
1980 5 to 7.5 7.5 to 11 8.5 to 11.5
1981 10 to 11.5 9 to 12 8.5 to 11.5
1982 5.5 to 7.5 8 to 10.5 9.5 to 12.25
1983 9.25 to 10.75 9.75 to 10 7.25 to 11.25 8 to 9 7 to 9.5
1984 9.5 to 11.5 10.5 to 11 8 to 10.5 9 to 10 7 to 10.25 9 to 10
1985 6.25 to 7.75 6.5 to 7 7 to 8.5 8.5 to 8 6.75 to 9.5 8 to 9
1986 3.75 to 6.5 4.75 to 5.75 5 to 8.5 6.5 to 7.25 5.5 to 8.5 7 to 7.5
1987 5.75 to 7.25 6.25 to 7 4.5 to 7.5 5.75 to 6.5 5 to 8.25 6 to 7.5
1988 4 to 7 5.75 to 6.75 4 to 6.5 5.25 to 6 5 to 8 5.75 to 7
1989 5 to 7.75 6 to 7 5.5 to 8.5 6.5 to 7.5 4 to 7.5 5 to 7
1990 5 to 6.5 5.5 to 6.5 4 to 7 5.5 to 6.5 4.25 to 7.5 5.5 to 6.75
1991 3.75 to 5.75 4.5 to 5.25 3.5 to 5.5 3.75 to 5.25 3.5 to 7 5.25 to 6.5
1992 5 to 6.25 5.25 to 6 4.5 to 5.75 5 to 6.25 4 to 6.75 5.5 to 6.5
1993 4.75 to 6.25 5 to 5.75 5.25 to 6.25 5.5 to 6 4.5 to 7 5.5 to 6.25
1994 5.25 to 6.5 5.5 to 6 4.75 to 7.5 5.5 to 6 4.5 to 6.75 5 to 6.5
1995 3.75 to 5.25 4.25 to 4.75 4.75 to 6.5 5 to 6 4.5 to 6.25 5 to 5.5
1996 4.75 to 5.75 5 to 5.5 4 to 5 4.25 to 4.75 4.625 to 5.5 4.75 to 5.375
1997 5 to 6 5 to 5.5 4.25 to 5.25 4.5 to 4.75 4 to 5.5  4.25 to 5
1998 4.25 to 5 4.5 to 5 3.5 to 5 3.75 to 4.5 4.25 to 5.75 4.5 to 5
1999 4.75 to 5.5 5 to 5.5 3.75 to 5 4 to 4.5 4 to 5.5 4.25 to 5
2000 6 to 7.25 6.25 to 6.75 5 to 6 5.25 to 5.5 4 to 5.25  4 to 5
2001 3.25 to 5 3.5 to 4.25 3.75 to 5.25 4 to 5 5 to 6.25 5.5 to 6
NOTE: The date refers to the calendar year being forecast. For example, the 18-month FR forecast for 1980 (8.5 to 11.5) was made in
July 1979.
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FOMC Real GNP/GDP Forecasts by Forecast Horizon
6-month 12-month 18-month
FR CT FR CT FR CT
1979 –2 to –0.5
1980 –5 to –2.5 –2.5 to 0.5 –0.5 to 2
1981 1 to 3.5 –1.5 to 1.5 0.5 to 3
1982 0.5 to 1.5 0.5 to 3 1 to 4
1983 4.75 to 6 5 to 5.75 3 to 5.5 3.5 to 4.5 2.5 to 4
1984 6 to 7 6.25 to 6.75 3.5 to 5 4 to 4.75 3 to 5 4 to 4.5
1985 2.25 to 3.25 2.75 to 3 3.25 to 4.25 3.5 to 4 2 to 4 3 to 3.25
1986 2.25 to 3.5 2.5 to 3 2.75 to 4.25 3 to 3.5 2 to 4 2.5 to 3.25
1987 2 to 3.75 2.5 to 3 2 to 4 2.5 to 3 2 to 4.25 3 to 3.5
1988 1 to 3.25 2.75 to 3 0.5 to 3 2 to 2.5 1 to 3 2.5 to 3
1989 1.5 to 2.75 2 to 2.5 1.5 to 3.25 2.5 to 3 1 to 3 2 to 2.5
1990 1 to 2 1.5 to 2 1 to 2.25 1.75 to 2 1 to 2.5 1.5 to 2
1991 0.5 to 1.5 0.75 to 1 –0.5 to 1.5 0.75 to 1.5 0 to 3 1.75 to 2.5
1992 2 to 3.25 2.25 to 2.75 1.5 to 2.75 1.75 to 2.5 2 to 3.5 2.25 to 3
1993 2 to 3.5 2.25 to 2.75 2.5 to 4 3 to 3.25 2.5 to 3.5 2.75 to 3
1994 3 to 3.5 3 to 3.25 2.5 to 3.75 3 to 3.25 2 to 3.25 2.5 to 3.25
1995 1.375 to 3 1.5 to 2 2 to 3.25 2 to 3 2.25 to 2.75 2.5 to 2.75
1996 2.5 to 3 2.5 to 2.75 1.5 to 2.5 2 to 2.25 2.125 to 3 2.25 to 2.75
1997 3 to 3.5 3 to 3.25 2 to 2.5 2 to 2.25 1.5 to 2.5 1.75 to 2.25
1998 2.75 to 3.25 3 to 3.25 1.75 to 3 2 to 2.75 2 to 3 2 to 2.5
1999 3.25 to 4 3.5 to 3.75 2 to 3.5 2.5 to 3 2 to 3 2 to 2.5
2000 3.75 to 5 4 to 4.5 3.25 to 4.25 3.5 to 3.75 2 to 3.5 2.5 to 3
2001 1 to 2 1.25 to 2  2 to 2.75 2 to 2.5 2.5 to 4 3.25 to 3.75
NOTE: See note for Table A1.
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FOMC Inflation Forecasts by Forecast Horizon
6-month 12-month 18-month
FR CT FR CT FR CT
1979 9.5 to 11
1980 9 to 10 9 to 11 8.5 to 10.5
1981 7.5 to 9 9 to 10.5 7.75 to 9.5
1982 4.75 to 6 6.5 to 7.75 6.5 to 8.5
1983 4 to 5.25 4.25 to 4.75 3.5 to 5.5 4 to 5 4 to 5.75
1984 3.25 to 4.5 4 to 4.5 4 to 6 4.5 to 5 3.25 to 6.5 4.25 to 5
1985 3.5 to 4.25 3.75 to 4 3 to 4.75 3.5 to 4 3.5 to 6.5 5.25 to 5.5
1986 1.5 to 3.25 2.25 to 2.75 2.5 to 4.5 3 to 4 3 to 5.5 3.75 to 4.75
1987 3 to 4.25 3.5 to 4 2.5 to 4 3 to 3.5 1.5 to 4.25 3 to 4
1988 2.75 to 4 3 to 3.75 2.5 to 4 3.25 to 3.75 2.5 to 5 3.75 to 4.25
1989 4.5 to 5.75 5 to 5.5 3.5 to 5.5 4.5 to 5 2 to 5 3 to 4.5
1990 4 to 5 4.5 to 5 3.5 to 5 4 to 4.5 3 to 5.75 4.5 to 5
1991 3 to 4.5 3.25 to 3.75 3 to 4.5 3.25 to 4 3.5 to 5 3.75 to 4.5
1992 3 to 3.5 3 to 3.5 2.5 to 3.5 3 to 3.5 2.5 to 4.25 3 to 4
1993 3 to 3.5 3 to 3.25 2.5 to 3 2.5 to 2.75 2.5 to 4 2.75 to 3.25
1994 2.5 to 3.5 2.75 to 3 2.25 to 4 3 to 3 2 to 4.25 3 to 3.5
1995 3 to 3.5 3.125 to 3.375 2.75 to 3.75 3 to 3.5 2 to 4.5 2.75 to 3.5
1996 3 to 3.25 3 to 3.25 2.5 to 3 2.75 to 3 2.5 to 3.5 2.875 to 3.25
1997 2 to 2.75 2.25 to 2.5 2.75 to 3.5 2.75 to 3 2.5 to 3.25 2.75 to 3
1998 1.25 to 2.25 1.75 to 2 1.5 to 2.5 1.75 to 2.25 2.5 to 3 2.5 to 3
1999 1.75 to 2.5 2.25 to 2.5 1.5 to 2.5 2 to 2.5 1.5 to 3 2 to 2.5
2000 2 to 2.75 2.5 to 2.75 1.5 to 2.5 1.75 to 2 1.75 to 2.5 2.25 to 2.5
2001 2 to 2.75 2 to 2.5   1.75 to 2.5 1.75 to 2.25 1.75 to 3 2 to 2.5
NOTE: From 1979 through 1988, the FOMC reported forecasts for the GNP/GDP deflator; from 1989 through 1999, the FOMC reported
forecasts for the CPI; and in 2000 and 2001, the FOMC reported forecasts for the chain price index for PCE. See, also, note for Table A1.
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FOMC Fourth-Quarter Average Unemployment Rate Forecasts 
6-month 12-month 18-month
FR CT FR CT FR CT
1979 6.25 to 7
1980 8.5 to 9.25 6.75 to 8 6.75 to 8.25
1981 7.5 to 8.25 8 to 8.5 8 to 9.25
1982 9 to 9.75 8.25 to 9.5 7 to 8.5
1983 9 to 9.75 9.5 to 9.5 9.5 to 10.5 9.9 to 10.4 8.5 to 9.5
1984 6.5 to 7.25 6.75 to 7 7.25 to 8 7.25 to 7.75 8.25 to 9.25 8.25 to 8.75
1985 6.75 to 7.25 7 to 7.25 6.5 to 7.25 6.75 to 7 6.25 to 7.25 6.5 to 7
1986 6.9 to 7.2 7 to 7 6.25 to 6.75 6.5 to 6.5 6.75 to 7.5 6.75 to 7.25
1987 6.1 to 6.5 6.2 to 6.4 6.5 to 6.75 6.5 to 6.75 6.5 to 7 6.75 to 6.75
1988 5.25 to 6.5 5.25 to 5.75 5.5 to 6.75 5.75 to 6 5.9 to 6.8 6 to 6.5
1989 5 to 6 5.5 to 5.5 5 to 6 5.25 to 5.25 5 to 7 5.5 to 6
1990 5.5 to 6.5 5.5 to 5.75 5.5 to 6.5 5.5 to 5.75 5 to 6.5 5.5 to 6
1991 6.5 to 7 6.75 to 7 6.25 to 7.5 6.5 to 7 5.25 to 7 5.5 to 6
1992 7 to 7.5 7.25 to 7.5 6.75 to 7.25 6.75 to 7 6 to 6.75 6.25 to 6.5
1993 6.5 to 7 6.75 to 6.75 6.5 to 7 6.75 to 7 6.5 to 7.25 6.5 to 7
1994 6 to 6.25 6 to 6.25 6.5 to 6.75 6.5 to 6.75 6.25 to 7 6.5 to 6.75
1995 5.5 to 6.25 5.75 to 6.125 5.25 to 6 5.5 to 5.5 5.75 to 6.5 6 to 6.25
1996 5.25 to 5.75 5.5 to 5.5 5.5 to 6 5.5 to 5.75 5.5 to 6.25 5.75 to 6.125
1997 4.75 to 5.25 4.75 to 5 5.25 to 5.5 5.25 to 5.5 5.5 to 6 5.5 to 5.75
1998 4.25 to 4.5 4.25 to 4.5 4.5 to 5 4.75 to 4.75 4.5 to 5.25 4.75 to 5
1999 4 to 4.5 4 to 4.25 4.25 to 4.75 4.25 to 4.5 4.25 to 4.75 4.5 to 4.75
2000 4 to 4.25 4 to 4 4 to 4.25 4 to 4.25 4 to 4.5 4 to 4.25
2001 4.75 to 5 4.75 to 5 4.5 to 5 4.5 to 4.5 4 to 4.5 4 to 4.25
NOTE: See note for Table A1.
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Real-Time Data Available in February and May
February May
Nominal Real Nominal  Real 
output output  Unemployment  output output  Unemployment 
growth growth Inflation rate growth growth Inflation rate
1978 12.91 4.26 8.29 5.83 13.11 4.44 8.30 5.83
1979 9.87 0.83 8.97 5.87 9.92 0.96 8.87 5.87
1980 9.82 –0.03 9.86 7.50 9.39 –0.34 9.75 7.50
1981 9.31 0.67 8.58 8.37 9.80 0.86 8.87 8.37
1982 3.27 –1.23 4.56 10.67 3.50 –0.87 4.40 10.67
1983 10.37 6.06 4.06 8.47 10.50 6.20 4.05 8.47
1984 9.35 5.62 3.53 7.20 9.53 5.70 3.62 7.20
1985 5.78 2.54 3.15 7.00 5.37 2.14 3.16 7.00
1986 4.42 2.21 2.16 6.83 4.18 2.04 2.10 6.83
1987 7.23 3.85 3.25 5.90 7.45 4.00 3.31 5.90
1988 7.02 2.71 4.19 5.33 7.23 2.81 4.29 5.33
1989 6.37 2.43 3.85 5.30 6.44 2.57 3.77 5.30
1990 4.34 0.35 3.98 5.90 4.50 0.49 3.99 5.90
1991 3.22 0.23 2.99 6.97 3.28 0.27 3.00 6.97
1992 5.36 2.92 2.37 7.33 5.71 3.15 2.48 7.33
1993 5.11 2.84 2.21 6.53 5.36 3.10 2.19 6.53
1994 6.38 4.00 2.28 5.57 6.47 4.14 2.24 5.57
1995 3.68* 1.27* 2.37* 5.57 3.68 1.27 2.37 5.57
1996 5.18 3.36 1.76 5.27 4.97 3.14 1.77 5.27
1997 5.76 3.89 1.80 4.70 5.58 3.74 1.77 4.70
1998 5.07 4.15 0.88 4.40 5.17 4.25 0.88 4.40
1999 5.92 4.25 1.60 4.10 6.26 4.60 1.59 4.10
2000 5.92 3.49 2.34 3.97 5.80 3.41 2.31 3.97
2001 1.94 0.13 1.81 5.60 2.34 0.48 1.86 5.60
NOTE: Fourth-quarter-over-fourth-quarter growth rates.
*February real-time values for 1995 were not actually released until March. The values here are taken from the Survey of Current
Business, March 1996, Table 7.1.
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Real-Time Data Available in August and November
August November
Nominal Real Nominal  Real 
output output  Unemployment  output output  Unemployment 
growth growth Inflation rate growth growth Inflation rate
1978 13.39 4.80 8.20 5.83 13.39 4.80 8.20 5.83
1979 9.92 0.96 8.87 5.87 9.92 0.96 8.87 5.87
1980 9.39 –0.34 9.75 7.50 9.39 –0.34 9.75 7.50
1981 9.63 0.72 8.84 8.37 9.63 0.72 8.84 8.37
1982 2.55 –1.74 4.37 10.67 2.55 –1.74 4.37 10.67
1983 10.36 6.35 3.77 8.47 10.36 6.35 3.77 8.47
1984 9.53 5.70 3.62 7.20 9.53 5.70 3.62 7.20
1985 6.30 2.89 3.31 7.00 6.30 2.89 3.31 7.00
1986 4.48 2.21 2.22 6.83 4.48 2.21 2.22 6.83
1987 8.32 5.04 3.12 5.90 8.32 5.04 3.12 5.90
1988 7.53 3.40 4.00 5.33 7.53 3.40 4.00 5.33
1989 5.58 1.82 3.69 5.30 5.58 1.82 3.69 5.30
1990 4.50 0.49 3.99 5.90 4.50 0.49 3.99 5.90
1991 3.45 0.10 3.35 6.97 3.45 0.10 3.35 6.97
1992 5.71 3.15 2.48 7.33 6.73 3.87 2.76 7.33
1993 5.01 3.11 1.84 6.53 5.01 3.11 1.84 6.53
1994 6.47 4.14 2.24 5.57 6.47 4.14 2.24 5.57
1995 3.78 1.30 2.45 5.57 3.78 1.30 2.45 5.57
1996 5.57 3.25 2.24 5.27 5.57 3.25 2.24 5.27
1997 5.58 3.83 1.69 4.70 5.58 3.83 1.69 4.70
1998 5.17 4.25 0.88 4.40 5.85 4.61 1.18 4.40
1999 6.52 4.96 1.48 4.10 6.52 4.96 1.48 4.10
2000 5.31 2.81 2.43 3.97 5.31 2.81 2.43 3.97
2001 2.00 0.05 1.95 5.60
NOTE: Fourth-quarter-over-fourth-quarter growth rates.
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Real-Time Data for Monetary Aggregates and Other Price Indices
PCE 
Output forecasts
chain price index: 
CPI: Monetary  Bureau of 
M1 growth M2 growth M3 growth policy reports Economic Analysis
1978
1979
1980 7.3 9.8 9.9
1981 2.3 9.4 11.4
1982 8.5 9.2 10.1
1983 7.2 8.3 9.7
1984 5.2 7.7 10.5
1985 12.7 8.6 7.4
1986 15.2 8.9 8.8
1987 6.2 4 5.4
1988 4.3 5.3 6.2
1989 0.6 4.6 3.3 4.5
1990 4.2 3.9 1.8 6.3
1991 8 3.1 1.3 2.9
1992 14.3 1.9 0.5 3.0
1993 10.5 1.4 0.6 2.7
1994 2.3 1 1.4 2.6
1995 –1.8 4.2 6.1 2.6
1996 –4.5 4.6 6.8 3.1
1997 –1.2 5.7 8.8 1.9
1998 1.8 8.5 10.9 1.5
1999 1.9 6.2 7.5 2.6
2000 –1.8 5.6 8.9 3.4 2.4
2001 6.9 10.3 12.9 1.3
NOTE: Fourth-quarter-over-fourth-quarter growth rates.
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H.15 Interest Rate Data 
January average June average
10-year 1-year  Overnight  10-year 1-year  Overnight 
Treasury bond  Treasury bill federal funds rate Treasury bond Treasury bill federal funds rate
1978 7.96 7.28 6.70 8.46 8.09 7.60
1979 9.10 10.41 10.07 8.91 9.57 10.29
1980 10.80 12.06 13.82 9.78 8.16 9.47
1981 12.57 14.08 19.08 13.47 14.86 19.10
1982 14.59 14.32 13.22 14.30 14.07 14.15
1983 10.46 8.62 8.68 10.85 9.66 8.98
1984 11.67 9.90 9.56 13.56 12.08 11.06
1985 11.38 9.02 8.35 10.16 7.80 7.53
1986 9.19 7.73 8.14 7.80 6.73 6.92
1987 7.08 5.78 6.43 8.40 6.80 6.73
1988 8.67 6.99 6.83 8.92 7.49 7.51
1989 9.10 9.05 9.12 8.28 8.44 9.53
1990 8.21 7.92 8.23 8.48 8.10 8.29
1991 8.09 6.64 6.91 8.28 6.36 5.90
1992 7.03 4.15 4.03 7.26 4.17 3.76
1993 6.60 3.50 3.02 5.96 3.54 3.04
1994 5.75 3.54 3.05 7.10 5.27 4.25
1995* 7.78 7.05 5.53 6.17 5.64 6.00
1996 5.65 5.09 5.56 6.91 5.81 5.27
1997 6.58 5.61 5.25 6.49 5.69 5.56
1998 5.54 5.24 5.56 5.50 5.41 5.56
1999 4.72 4.51 4.63 5.90 5.10 4.76
2000 6.66 6.12 5.46 6.10 6.17 6.53
2001 5.16 4.81 5.98 5.28 3.58 3.97
Table A8